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Abstract 
 
Although safety statistics indicate that road crashes are the most common form of work-related 
fatalities, many organizations fail to treat company vehicles in the same manner as other 
physical safety hazards within the workplace. Traditionally, work-related road safety has 
targeted primarily driver-related issues and not adequately addressed organizational processes, 
such as the organizations’ safety system and risk management processes and practice. This 
inadequacy generally stems from a lack of specific contextual knowledge and basic 
requirements to improve work-related road safety, including the supporting systems to ensure 
any intervention strategy or initiative’s ongoing effectiveness. Therefore, informed by previous 
research and based on a case study methodology, the Organizational Work-Related Road 
Safety Situational Analysis was developed to assess organizations’ current work-related road 
safety system, including policy, procedures, processes and practice. The situational analysis 
tool is similar to a safety audit however is more comprehensive in detail, application and 
provides sufficient evidence to enable organizations to mitigate and manage their work-related 
road safety risks. In addition, data collected from this process assists organizations in making 
informed decisions regarding intervention strategy design, development, implementation and 
ongoing effectiveness. This paper reports on the effectiveness of the situational analysis tool to 
assess WRRS systems across five differing and diverse organizations; including gas exploration 
and mining, state government, local government, and not for profit/philanthropy. The outcomes 
of this project identified considerable differences in the degree by which the organizations’ 
addressed work-related road safety across their vehicle fleet operations and provides guidelines 
for improving organizations’ work-related road safety systems. 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Bien que les statistiques de sécurité indiquent que les accidents de la route sont la forme la plus 
courante de décès liés au travail, de nombreuses organisations ne parviennent pas à traiter les 
véhicules d‘entreprise de la même manière que les autres risques pour la sécurité physique sur 
le lieu de travail. Traditionnellement, la sécurité routière liée au travail a ciblé principalement les 
problèmes liés aux conducteurs et a délaissé les processus organisationnels, tels les systèmes 
de sécurité des organisations et les processus et pratiques de gestion des risques. Cette 
insuffisance découle généralement d'un manque de connaissance du contexte spécifique et des 
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exigences de base pour améliorer la sécurité routière au travail, y compris des systèmes de 
soutien aux stratégies d'intervention ou à l'efficacité dans le temps des interventions. Par 
conséquent, incorporant les résultats des recherches précédentes aux résultats de notre étude 
de cas, une analyse organisationnelle de la situation de la sécurité routière liée au travail a été 
développée pour évaluer les activités actuelles liées à la sécurité routière au travail, incluant 
entre autres les régulations, les procédures, les processus et les pratiques. L'outil d'analyse de 
la situation, similaire à un audit de sécurité, est cependant plus complet en termes de détails et 
d'application et fournit des éléments de preuve suffisants pour permettre aux organisations de 
gérer et d'atténuer les risques liés à la sécurité routière au travail. En outre, les données 
recueillies par ce processus aident les organisations à prendre des décisions éclairées 
concernant la conception, le développement, la mise en œuvre et le suivi dans le temps de la 
stratégie d'intervention. Ce manuscrit présente l'efficacité de l'outil d'analyse de la situation pour 
évaluer les systèmes de sécurité routière liée au travail après analyse de cinq organisations 
différentes et de caractéristiques diverses: exploration de gaz et l'exploitation minière, 
organisations gouvernementales, collectivités locales, et organisations à but non lucratifs. Les 
résultats de ce projet ont identifié des différences considérables dans le degré par lequel les 
organisations traitent la sécurité routière liée au travail dans leurs opérations de la flotte de 
véhicules et fournit des lignes directrices pour l'amélioration des systèmes de sécurité routière 
liée au travail des organisations.    
 
CONTEXT 
 
Within Australia a large proportion of vehicles on the road are utilised for work purposes. For 
example, approximately 75% of locally produced passenger vehicles are purchased as 
organizational fleet vehicles [1-2] and fleet vehicles represent more than half of all new vehicle 
registrations annually [1-3]. Previous research and occupational safety statistics indicate that 
road crashes are the most common form of work-related fatalities [4]. Work-Related Traumatic 
Injury Fatality statistics indicate a high proportion of work-related deaths have occurred during 
work-related vehicle travel [5]. In addition, Figure 1 illustrates the high proportion of work 
fatalities involving motor vehicles (46%) as the primary mechanism of injury compared to the 
next highest mechanism of injury consisting of being hit by moving objects (12%) and falls from 
heights (11%) [5]. Furthermore, there has been little change in work-related vehicle fatalities 
compared to previous years, with 49% in 1989-92 [6] through to the period 2003-10 where 46% 
of all fatalities [5] resulted from vehicle incidents. Although there had been a decrease in 
vehicle-related fatalities in recent years (e.g., 2009 – 112 fatalities, 2010 – 80 fatalities, 2011 – 
77 fatalities), in 2012 work-related vehicle incident fatalities increased in Australia to 87 fatalities 
[5]. Although driving for the purpose of work has been included in both previous [7] and current 
[8] occupational health and safety legislation, there is no substantial evidence that government 
regulators practice enforcement in the area of work-related road safety [2]. In addition, despite 
the legal obligations, costs and trauma associated with work-related vehicle incidents, many 
organizations lack commitment, as well as, the necessary risk management frameworks and 
processes central to minimizing work-related road safety risk [2, 9-11].  
 
In Australia, a vehicle utilized for the purpose of work is classified as a workplace under the 
national Work, Health and Safety legislation [8]. Therefore, employer organizations and other 
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stakeholders are obligated to ensure a safe place to work and safe system of work in the use of 
all work-related vehicles. However, many organizations fail to treat company vehicles in the 
same way, even though it is acknowledged as effective health and safety practice to assess and 
control these risks in the same way as other physical hazards at work. A growing body of 
evidence suggests that strategies to address the work-related road safety (WRRS) problem 
should be directed toward the employer organization and its safety system, as well as driver 
skills, ability and behavior. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that many organizations are 
generally limited in specific knowledge and experience relating to WRRS issues and 
subsequent control measures [12].  
 
 
Figure 1 - Worker fatalities: Proportion by mechanism of incident, Australia, 2003–04 to 
2009–10 combined [2] 
 
In an endeavor to improve WRRS, organizations have traditionally adopted a “silver or golden 
bullet” approach aimed at developing and implementing a single strategy or countermeasure to 
encompass and address all WRRS issues or problems [11]. Intervention strategies have 
invariably been implemented in reaction to an increase in numbers or severity of work-related 
vehicle crashes or incidents [11]. These intervention strategies often involved an overreliance 
on driver training, generally based on enhancing driver skills and not targeting specific driver 
behaviors or organizational influences [13]. An emphasis on strategies to improve the driving 
skills of drivers, exemplifies the perceptions of organizational management that the driver, more 
specifically a lack of driver skills and ability, is primarily to “blame” for work-related 
incidents/crashes [8].  In contrast, road safety researchers and professionals have advocated a 
more proactive approach to work-related road safety intervention strategies, aimed at 
preventing incidents occurring [10-11,13]. Furthermore, if WRRS intervention strategies are to 
be effective then there is a reliance on an organizations’ WRRS management system to be 
sufficiently developed to not only maintain but also support the ongoing effectiveness of any 
strategy or countermeasure aimed at improving WRRS.    
 
Accordingly, there is a need to not only understand the scope and nature of work-related road 
safety, but also the organizational influences and enablers for improvement. Subsequently, in 
order for organizations to improve WRRS they would need to ensure that WRRS is sufficiently 
addressed within the organization’s occupational health and safety management system. 
However, for many organizations the knowledge and experience related to addressing WRRS 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Other mechanisms
Being assaulted by a person or persons
Drowning
Being trapped by moving machinery or equipment
Contact with electricity
Being trapped between stationary & moving…
Being hit by falling objects
Falls from a height
Being hit by moving objects
Vehicle incident
Percentage of worker fatalities
M
ec
ha
ni
sm
 o
f  
in
ci
de
nt
24th Canadian Multidisciplinary Road Safety Conference, 
Vancouver, B.C., June 1-4, 2014 
24ème Conférence canadienne multidisciplinaire sur la sécurité routière, 
                                                                     Vancouver, B.C., 1-4 juin 2014                                                            4 
 
problems remains limited and therefore safety management systems do not address WRRS 
issues adequately. 
 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
The identification of safety hazards and risks and their associated control measures provides 
the foundation for any safety program and essentially determines the scope, content and 
complexity of an effective occupational health and safety management system (OHS MS) [14-
15]. However, if these basic risk management principles are performed ineffectively, the ability 
of the OHS MS to sustain health and safety will be limited, and the OHS MS may degenerate 
into a “paper system” [16]. Similarly, the level of commitment to safety by both management and 
employees has a significant bearing on the level in which safety issues are addressed within the 
organization. For example, if the direction of the organization is to only maintain legislative 
compliance and not proactively target safety hazards and risks, then the potential effectiveness 
of the OHS MS is reduced.  
 
In the case of WRRS, there is a gap within current knowledge, research and practice regarding 
the assessment of WRRS safety systems and practice. In order to mitigate this gap and develop 
a tool for assessing WRRS safety systems, the authors used a conceptual framework [14] 
developed for the assessment of generalist occupational health and safety management 
systems comprising of three major approaches. The three major approaches that have emerged 
in general OHS MS research include: a safe place, safe person and safe systems (see Figure 
2). In relation to WRRS, the OHS MS framework [14] encompasses three general albeit priority 
areas that influence the effectiveness of any WRRS system, hence safety maintenance and 
improvement. In terms relating to WRRS, a “safe place” refers to the work vehicle or site; a 
“safe person” indicates driver related influences and outcomes; and “safe systems” represents 
organizational WRRS policy, procedures, processes and practice.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Strategies for dealing with complex hazards [14] 
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By utilizing this systems approach framework and based on a case study methodology, the 
Organizational Work-Related Road Safety Situational Analysis was developed. The situational 
analysis tool is similar to a safety audit, however is more comprehensive in detail, application 
and provides sufficient evidence for the improvement of WRRS systems and more effectively 
inform intervention strategy development, implementation and ongoing effectiveness. The 
primary objective of this project was to assess the ability of the Organizational Work-Related 
Road Safety Situational Analysis tool to identify areas for WRRS improvement within 
organizations. Specifically, trialing and reporting the facilitation of the situational analysis tool 
within differing and diverse organizations in relation to organizational WRRS systems. 
 
 
TARGET GROUP 
 
The Organizational Work-Related Road Safety Situational Analysis tool is designed to be 
utilized across any organization where driving for work purposes is performed. This paper 
reports on the effectiveness of the situational analysis tool to assess WRRS systems across five 
differing and diverse organizations; including gas exploration and mining, state government, 
local government, and not for profit/philanthropy. Although all organizations stated that they 
wanted their organization name and specific area of operations to remain confidential, the 
following details provide a greater indication on the type of industry and related work tasks 
undertaken by each organization: 
 
 Organization A – Liquid natural gas exploration and mining company operating in rural 
and remote areas of Queensland, Australia. The organization operates with a 
considerable contractor workforce as well as their own company employees; 
 Organization B – Similarly, Organization B is a liquid natural gas exploration and 
mining company also operating within rural and remote areas of regional Queensland. 
However, Organization B is a subsidiary of a larger international company. Also, the 
organization operates with a considerable contractor workforce as well as their own 
company employees; 
 Organization C – State government owned corporation providing management, 
operation, maintenance and services relating to natural resource provision; 
 Organization D – Local government authority operating in south-east Queensland, 
Australia; and 
 Organizational E – Not for profit organization providing a number of philanthropy and 
voluntary services. The organization has a considerable volunteer worker/driver 
workforce. 
 
 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Data collection utilized multiple information sources, including documents, archival records, 
interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and physical artifacts. For example, 
Figure 3 provides an outline of the situational analysis process where data collection is divided 
into four major parts: 1) a review of organizational WRRS records, documentation and 
initiatives, including an analysis of crash data, prior to any organization site visits; 2) on site 
interviews with all levels of staff related to WRRS practice within the organization; 3) 
observations of WRRS activities at sites/workplaces; and 4) organizational physical artifacts 
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including site and vehicle inspections. In relation to the OHS MS framework (Figure 2), parts 1 
and 2 of the WRRS Organizational Situational Analysis method assessed the “safe systems” 
component for each organization. In addition, part 3 identified issues relating to “safe persons” 
and part 4 targeted the “safe place” component.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Organizational Work-Related Situational Analysis Outline and Data Collection 
Methodology 
Primarily, this project focussed on determining the effectiveness of current work-related road 
safety within each of the five employer organisations. The multi-level process adopted a 
triangulation approach with the data from each stage (or part) of data collection being drawn 
from different sources. The term triangulation is borrowed from navigational circles, where it is a 
strategy for taking multiple reference points to locate an unknown position and was first applied 
in the academic setting in 1959 to enhance research [17]. In the academic setting triangulation 
refers to the use of a combination of research methods to gain a holistic understanding and to 
depict more accurately the phenomenon being investigated [17]. Likewise, the WRRS 
Organisational Situational Analysis methodology used dissimilar but complementary methods of 
data collection to achieve convergent validity (see Figure 3). This amalgamation of methods 
was adopted to counterbalance the weaknesses of one method with the strengths of other 
methods [17]. 
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1. Review of Organizational Records, Documentation and Initiatives 
 
Part one included a review of all current organizational documentation, data and evidence 
related to work-related road safety from each organization. For example information requested 
included: policy and procedures, risk assessments, crash data records/databases, driver 
infringement records, complaints reports/records, investigation reports, crash/incident report 
forms, pre trip inspection forms, maintenance data, intervention or initiative details and 
evaluations (if applicable), training and education plans/schedules and completion, driver 
competency and assessments, safety meeting minutes, vehicle suitability and selection 
processes, driver history check processes, and site and vehicle safety inspection reports. Prior 
to attending any organization’s site or conducting interviews/focus groups the above information 
was requested for initial review and analysis. The information was requested to be sent to 
researchers via email or as discussed previously with organizational contacts. 
 
Table 1 reveals that none of the organizations who participated within this project adequately 
addressed all targeted areas within the WRRS Organizational Situational Analysis. However, 
Organization B which is in the early developmental stage or construction phase of their 
operations at the Surat Basin Queensland did target many of the areas. For Organization B, the 
considerable focus in the area of WRRS was a direct result from policy and processes already 
developed by Organization B’s parent company (international mining/gas organization). In 
contrast, Organizations A, C, D and E did not adopt many of the important factors that influence 
or impact on WRRS. Rather, the areas addressed by these organizations primarily concentrated 
on more administrative areas or reactive data collection (e.g., incident reports) and not on 
proactive areas to improve WRRS or prevent work-related vehicle incidents occurring.    
 
A sample of each organization’s work-related vehicle crash/incident data was requested so as 
to analyze potential problems or trends specific to each organization. Five years of 
crash/incident data was requested, however Organizations C and E could only provide three 
years; Organizations A and B, due to the companies early developmental stages of operations, 
could only provide approximately one year of work-related vehicle crash/incident data; and 
Organization D did not record crash data on a database (only individual incident reports were 
kept).Unfortunately, there were considerable discrepancy across all organizations in relation to 
the type and extensiveness of data recorded for work-related vehicle incidents. Subsequently, 
analysis could not effectively compare incidents/trends across the five organizations. Rather, 
this process highlighted deficiencies in data collection and recording for all organizations 
involved.  
 
In relation to previous WRRS intervention strategies or initiatives implemented within the 
participating organizations, no organization had any records of evaluations or documentary 
evidence relating to the effectiveness of any strategies or initiatives. Both Organizations A and B 
had implemented driver training programs relating to general driving safety and four wheel drive 
safety specific training. However, no records regarding evaluation or effectiveness of programs 
were reported or recorded. In addition, Organization C did recently (3 years prior) introduce 
generic driver training via a third party driver training organization. However, no records were 
kept in relation to the success or effectiveness of the training nor were any noticeable 
improvements in relation to the organization’s work-related vehicle crash rates in following 
years. 
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Documentation/Data/Information  Organization 
A B C D E 
Policy and Procedure       
Vehicle Use Guidelines       
Driver safety/behavior policy and 
procedures 
x  x x x 
Responsibility and accountability x  x x x 
Consultation and communication 
processes 
x x x x x 
Induction processes x  x x x 
Risk management processes x  x x x 
Fatigue management x  x x x 
Journey management x  x x x 
Vehicle crash/incident reporting, 
recording and analysis 
  x x x 
Incident investigation process x x x x x 
Infringement monitoring   x x x 
Repeat offender processes x x x x x 
Vehicle maintenance procedures   x  x 
Mandatory training and education   x x x 
Reports      
Incident/crash reporting forms      
Pre-Start vehicle checklists x  x  x 
Journey management/travel forms x x x x x 
Schedules/Plans      
Training and education plans x  x x x 
Vehicle maintenance   x  x 
Data      
Crash/incident data    x  
Infringement/offence data x x x x x 
Complaints data x x x  x 
 
Table 1 - Outline of organizations’ WRRS related documentation developed and in use 
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2. Organizational Staff Interviews/Focus Groups 
 
Data collection for Part two of the case study approach aimed to elicit data from two areas. 
Firstly, the interviews/focus groups proved to be instrumental in the identification of additional 
organizational records, documentation and initiatives not provided previously by organizational 
management. Secondly, Part two utilized a combination of key informant semi-structured 
interviews and/or focus groups to obtain specific data relating to: 
 
1)  Organizational systems including policy, procedures, processes and practice related 
to the organization’s work-related road safety;  
2)  Work-related road safety risk management strategies and controls; 
3)  Organizational factors including management commitment and support;  
4)  What intervention strategies and/or initiatives have previously or are currently utilized 
within each organization;   
5)  Enablers for and barriers to intervention strategy and initiative ongoing support; and 
6)  Identification of any additional documentation, records or initiatives not previously 
provided as part of Part One. 
 
Interviews/focus groups were facilitated at each organizations’ site or head office and 
encompassed three levels of staff, including executive management (primarily Head Office staff) 
and operational management, supervisory staff and team leaders, and operational 
staff/employees and contractors (work-related vehicle drivers). While most interviews (i.e., 
management) were conducted on a one-to-one basis, focus group discussions were facilitated 
with groups of 5-10 participants. Overall, the number of participants (see Table 2) depended 
upon the size of the organization and staff members available at the time of the interviews/focus 
groups. The questions used within the interviews and focus groups were developed as part of 
the WRRS Organizational Situational Analysis process. For instance, comprehensive questions 
were cultivated and aimed at eliciting information relating to 26 major areas of a WRRS system, 
such as (to name a few): policy and procedures, communication, responsibility and 
accountability, risk management, employee professional development plans, WRRS budget, 
vehicle maintenance procedures, driver behavior, etc. 
 
Organizational Staff Levels Org. A Org. B Org. C Org. D Org. E 
Executive and operational management 5 4 2 3 2 
Supervisors and team leaders 11 8 6 10 4 
Employees and contractors 24 30 16 17 12 
 
Table 2 - Number of participants from each staffing level 
 
Although Part 2 was primarily concerned with ascertaining the presence and effectiveness of 
the various elements of WRRS within each organization, Table 3 shows major themes that 
emerged from the interviews/focus groups and provides examples of participant responses 
relating to issues identified by participants as major WRRS factors or influences. The major 
themes identified in Table 3 provide additional information in relation to the comprehensiveness 
and/or inadequacies of WRRS processes and practice for the participating organizations.  
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Theme Examples 
 
Policy and 
procedures 
 
WRRS systems and 
processes 
 
 
Risk management 
strategies 
 
Management 
commitment and 
support 
 
Consultation and 
communication 
 
 
Ownership of 
WRRS 
 
 
 
Productivity versus 
safety  
 
 
Previous WRRS 
intervention 
strategies or 
initiatives 
 
WRRS Knowledge, 
Experience and 
Training 
 
 
“I am not aware of any specific policy or procedures related to work-
related driving safety” (Operational employee – Organization C). 
 
“What systems … most of the guys don’t even do the mandatory vehicle 
pre-start checks because they know no one checks them” (Field 
employee – Organization C). 
 
“We do risk assessments for all general work tasks but not for work-
related driving” (Supervisor – Organization A). 
 
“Productivity will always reign over safety … there’s no commitment or 
support for work-related driving safety” (Employee – Organization E).  
 
 
“We are informed about OHS (occupational health and safety) changes 
but I’ve never been informed about any work-related road safety issues, 
etc” (Volunteer worker – Organization E).  
 
“The problem with work-related road safety is that no one takes 
ownership … fleet say it’s a workplace health and safety issue and the 
Occupational Health and Safety department believe it is a fleet 
department problem” (Supervisor – Organization C).   
 
“It is common knowledge that our staff make up time when driving 
between jobs, we know it is unsafe but our clients need us” (Area 
Supervisor - Organization E). 
 
“I can’t remember our company ever introducing any work-related road 
safety interventions, and I’ve been employed with the company for about 
15 years” (Field worker – Organization D). 
 
 
“I don’t think anyone in the organization has experience in work-related 
driving issues, because no one is willing to address the problem … I 
don’t even think anyone has even considered driving for work as a work-
specific safety issue” (Team Leader – Organization A). 
 
 
Table 3 - Themes associated with WRRS policy, procedures, processes and practice 
 
For all participating organizations the abbreviated results from Part 2 indicated considerable 
lack of organizational WRRS policy and procedures, addressing basic risk management 
principles, ownership and accountability of the problem, and mechanisms to promote 
communication of WRRS issues. Although Organizations A and B were more advanced in 
developing their WRRS systems, there was still room for considerable improvement. Notably, 
across most of the organizations there was limited management commitment to WRRS with 
some management blaming the drivers for work-related vehicle incidents. However, this result 
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may be a result of a lack of knowledge of the particular risks associated with work-related 
driving, as well as, few personnel with the relevant experience to address such risks. In addition, 
it was suggested that a lack of attention toward WRRS issues may also stem from productivity 
demands and level of resources allocated for WRRS.  
 
 
3.  Observations of Organization’s Work Related Road Safety 
 
The reason for conducting observations (Part 3) was primarily to assess vehicle 
driver’s/operator’s compliance with their respective organizations’ policy and procedures, as well 
as, occupational health and safety and traffic management (e.g., road rules) legislation. 
Observations of the daily aspects of the organizations’ WRRS operations were conducted 
during site visits. For example, operational aspects included (but not limited to): 
 
 Completion of daily pre-start vehicle checklists; 
 Loading, unloading and securing loads on vehicles; 
 Vehicle parking, reversing and low speed maneuvering; 
 Operation of vehicle on site premises (e.g., speed compliance); 
 Vehicle travel on-road; 
 Attendance at safety/works meetings; and 
 Compliance with road rules and organizational policy/procedures. 
 
Observations revealed that vehicle pre-start checklist procedures were completed on an ‘ad 
hoc’ basis across all organizations. For example, some drivers completed 100 percent of the 
required checks whilst drivers at another organization completed the vehicle pre-start checklist 
forms without undertaking any of the stipulated vehicle checks.  
 
Although all organizations stated within their policy and procedure documentation (including 
vehicle use guidelines) that all drivers are to comply with road rules, some drivers from across 
most organizations were observed travelling noticeably above the speed limit on both 
organizational sites and/or public roads. Interestingly, both organizations A and B fitted In 
Vehicle Monitoring systems into all work vehicles as a strategy to mitigate particularly speeding 
behavior. However, drivers were observed travelling above the speed limit at sites and on one 
occasion through road works.  
 
Attendance at organizations’ safety and works meetings revealed that WRRS was generally not 
discussed nor was it a standing topic on any safety meeting agenda. However, both 
Organizations A and B did communicate to staff details regarding any serious WRRS vehicle 
crashes. Any information provided to staff was in reaction to WRRS events and no proactive 
safety information was imparted.  
 
Observations based on organizational policy and procedure compliance proved difficult as the 
majority of the participating organizations had limited policy/procedures relating to specific 
WRRS practice; except that covered within general vehicle use guidelines.  
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4. Organization’s Physical Artifacts 
 
Part 4 examined the physical attributes of each organization’s WRRS system and included site 
and vehicle inspections. In relation to WRRS within organizations, the worksite and vehicle 
represents the “safe place” component as characterized within the OHS MS framework and an 
integral element within any WRRS system.  
 
Site inspections revealed that site safety signage, speed limits and directional signage varied 
significantly between each of the organizations’ sites/premises. Parking areas and parking 
vehicles also varied across all the organizations sites, with some drivers not complying with their 
own organization’s policy and procedures.  
 
Vehicles were generally kept in good order with most vehicles inspected showing regular 
periodic maintenance within vehicle log books. However, storage of equipment both inside and 
outside the vehicle cabin across most organizations failed to meet either organizational policy 
and procedures or government legislation (e.g., occupational health and safety). For example, 
inside many vehicle cabins loose items were positioned on seats, in vehicle centre console or 
on the dashboard; resulting in potential missiles in a crash. In addition, storage of equipment on 
the back of some utilities and trucks were not secured appropriately, and in some instances 
heavy loads were located on one side resulting in the vehicle being visibly unstable. 
Furthermore, additional tool boxes, ladders racks and other storage devices permanently 
positioned on vehicles varied across all organizations in relation to the requirements of 
Australian Standards, manufacturer recommendations, and organizational policy.     
 
Although it was previously mentioned that vehicle maintenance was undertaken adequately, it 
was perturbing to note that vehicle tire pressures on many vehicles (across all organizations) 
were not inflated to correct manufacturer specifications. Many vehicle tires were underinflated 
with some tires grossly overinflated. This problem accentuates the importance of pre-start 
vehicle checks and further demonstrates that these checks are not performed or are performed 
inadequately.    
 
 
DELIVERABLES 
 
A report was provided to each organization and included detailed description of data collected, 
comprehensiveness of WRRS practice, and recommendations for improvement. Consequently, 
the objective of this paper was to assess the ability of the situational analysis to obtain baseline 
data and inform recommendations for the improvement of WRRS within organizations.  
 
The results obtained from the implementation of the WRRS Organizational Situational Analysis 
across the five organizations provided a comprehensive insight into the WRRS systems of each 
organization. Encouragingly, all organizations expressed a willingness to improve their current 
WRRS systems albeit lacking the necessary knowledge, experience and current allocation of 
resources to make all the necessary changes. However, results indicated that across all 
organizations there was a lack of recognition and prioritization of the dangers and risks 
associated with work-related driving with the same consideration as other workplace hazards. 
Additionally, most organizations failed to adequately allocate effective ownership and 
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accountability for WRRS operations, with many in management neglecting commitment and 
support for fundamental aspects of their respective WRRS system.  
 
All four parts of the WRRS Organizational Situational Analysis highlighted limited documentation 
related to organizational WRRS policy, procedures, processes and practice. Policy and 
procedures state the “rules” by which all staff are required to comply, thereby ensuring that all 
staff are operating under the same guidelines and conditions. In addition, reporting, recording 
and analyzing data, such as crash-related data, was poorly undertaken by all organizations. The 
major concern in this area is a lack of attention to the details in reporting and recording crashes. 
Organizations would need to vastly improve this type of data collection procedures especially if 
they anticipate utilizing this information to better inform or even evaluate strategies to improve 
WRRS.  
 
The project highlighted the need for organizations to promptly implement strategies to improve 
WRRS, ensure the safety of their workforce and members of the public, and reduce the financial 
burden related to work-related vehicle incidents/crashes. In addition, this project revealed 
numerous deficiencies across all participating organizations. However, a full disclosure of all 
deficiencies and recommendations for improvement is beyond the scope and capacity of this 
paper. However, major recommendations include: 
 
 Utilize a WRRS specialist (e.g., experienced third party) to assist in the development 
of WRRS; 
 Initially target the development of comprehensive WRRS policy and procedures; 
 Determine and nominate ownership, responsibility and accountability for WRRS 
within the organization; 
 Allocate suitable time and resources for the development and implementation of the 
WRRS system; 
 Address risk management principles associated with a “safe place” (work vehicle or 
site); a “safe person” (staff/drivers); and “safe systems” (the organization); and  
 Provide proactive promotion of WRRS, such as, including WRRS within employee 
inductions, standing topic at safety/works meetings, implement suitable training and 
education, and encourage communication of relevant WRRS issues/changes to all 
staff.    
  
Work-related driving statistics reveal that driving for the purpose of work can be classified as a 
high risk operation. Therefore, applying recommendations and improving WRRS systems 
should result in safer outcomes for the organization, staff and members of the public. 
Furthermore, improvement of WRRS should lead to reduced work-related incidents/crashes 
thereby ensuring safer roads and healthier communities for all stakeholders. 
 
In conclusion, the Organizational Work-Related Road Safety Situational Analysis tool was 
pivotal in determining the extent of WRRS policy, procedures, processes and practice within 
each of the five participating organizations. The participating organizations not only differed in 
relation to number of employees and fleet vehicles but also represent a diverse range of 
industries comprised of different organizational operational requirements. Therefore, the results 
suggest that the situational analysis tool may be applicable to a wide range of organizational 
fleet environments to assess WRRS and inform strategies to reduce organizational work driving 
risk. Future intentions are to increase the uptake of the Organizational Work-Related Road 
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Safety Situational Analysis tool by organizations and empirically evaluate the tool across a wider 
range of organizational settings nationally and internationally. 
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